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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a breach of contract case in which Appellant Gary Duspiva ("Duspiva") sued the
Respondents Clyde Fillmore and John Fillmore ("Fillmores") over an agreement to drill a
domestic well.

The Fillmores counterclaimed alleging that Mr. Duspiva violated vanous

provisions of Idaho Consumer Protection Act. Idaho Code (I.C.)§46-60 1 et seq.
II.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS

The matter was tried in a court trial on August 23-25, 2010, in Canyon County District
Court before the Honorable Thomas J. Ryan. Closing arguments were submitted through post
trial briefs. R. Vol. II, p. 223-270 (Fillmore) and R. Vol. II, p. 204-222 (Duspiva). The district
court entered Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on October 18, 2010, holding that Mr.
Duspiva had violated Sections 16, 17, and 18 of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act. R. Vol. II,
p.288-300.
The court awarded the Fillmores damages in the amount of $27,500. !d. The district
court subsequently awarded the Fillmores' their costs and attorney fees. R. Vol. II, p. 319-323.
Mr. Duspiva has not appealed or otherwise challenged the award of costs and attorney fees by
the district court.
III.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

Mr. Duspiva is a licensed well driller in Idaho. As such, he is required to understand and
comply with laws and rules in the state regarding well drilling. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 98, L. 1-1.

He

holds himself out as a Master Ground Water Contractor. R. Vol. I, p.34, L. 19-21, R. Vol. II, p.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 1

289. Clyde Fillmore is a retired ironworker, farmer, construction worker and builder. Tr. Vol.
1a, p. 44, L. 24-25. 1
In April 2007, Clyde Fillmore contacted Mr. Duspiva about drilling a domestic well for
Clyde's son John Fillmore. At the time of the events leading to the drilling of the well by Mr.
Duspiva, Clyde's understanding of well drilling was extremely limited with his only experience
being related to another domestic well that was drilled on his property. R. Vol. II, p. 289. The
Fillmores and Mr. Duspiva all agree the discussion and eventual agreement was for a domestic
well. In fact, Mr. Duspiva acknowledged at trial the "sum total" of the agreement was for
nothing more than a domestic well. Tr. Vol. II, p. 6, L. 11. As documented in a Start Card
Permit for drilling that Mr. Duspiva obtained from the Idaho Department of Water Resources,
("IDWR") the proposed maximum depth of the well was to be 200 feet. 2 The Fillmores and Mr.
Duspiva also agree the price for the 200 foot well was to be $32.50 per foot plus some incidental
costs. Tr. Vol. 1, p.7, L. 2-3, Tr. Vol. la, p.15, L. 17-19. The agreement for Mr. Duspiva to drill
the 200 foot domestic well was not written.
After Clyde Fillmore identified a location for the well, Mr. Duspiva started drilling on or
about June 12, 2007, completing drilling activities on or about October 10, 2007.

As Mr.

Duspiva drilled, he encountered sand. In well drilling, it is a well established industry standard
to use a screen and filter pack to address sand in a well. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 192, L. 8-14; Tr. Vol. 2, p.

1 The original reporter's transcript lodged with the District Court consisted of three volumes, one for each of the
three days of trial, referred to herein as Vol. 1, Vol. 2, and Vol. 3. Transcription of the proceedings and testimony
on the morning of the first day of trial was not included in the original transcript. The reporter subsequently
prepared and lodged a transcript for the morning of the first day of trial, referred to herein as Vol. 1a.

2 A Start Card Permit is a self-issued permit for a single family domestic well available through the Idaho
Department of Water Resources. It is available for use only by licensed well drillers. It has 13 designated
conditions for its use and can only be used for cold water domestic wells with water less than 85° F. Condition 8
requires the driller to stop drilling and contact the IDWR if the well temperature reaches 85° F. The Start Card
Permit used by Duspiva for the Fillmore well is included in the Record as Exhibit C and at R. Vol. I, p. 074.
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168, L. 3-9. For reasons never disclosed at trial, Mr. Duspiva refuses to use screens and filter
packs to address sand. Notwithstanding the Start Card Pennit limiting the well to a depth of 200
feet, Mr. Duspiva continued drilling past the 200 foot maximum depth. As he drilled beyond
200 feet, Mr. Duspiva never contacted the IDWR, which is the state agency that regulates well
drilling and well drillers. However, Mr. Duspiva repeatedly told Clyde Fillmore that there was
"sand" in the well and recommended that he continue to drill deeper. Tr. Vol. la, p. 23, L. 7-8.
Mr. Fillmore, with no experience with well drilling and relying on Mr. Duspiva's
recommendation, never told Mr. Duspiva to stop drilling. R. Vol. la, p. 36, L. 10-15; Tr. Vol. 3,
p. 24, L. 1-6.
As Mr. Duspiva drilled, he encountered water at various levels. According to a diagram
eventually submitted to IDWR after the well had been drilled, Mr. Duspiva found water at 128131 feet and at 148-153 feet. Mr. Duspiva hit water at 320-348 feet and then at 360-362 feet.
He hit water at 580-585 feet, at 642-650 feet, at 670 feet, at 691 feet, at 701 feet. He hit water at
836 feet on August 6, 2007.

R. Exhibit A; R. Vol. I, p. 181. (Note: Exhibit A is a detailed

report by the IDWR dated November 6, 2008, on the drilling of the Fillmore well and the events
that led to the present suit. Exhibit A contains four pages plus several attachments and exhibits.
The diagram showing where and when Mr. Duspiva encountered water is Exhibit B to the
report.) Eventually Mr. Duspiva would drill the 200 foot well to over 1100 feet. R. Exhibit A,
Tr. Vol. 1, p. 71, L. 4. When Mr. Duspiva finished drilling, the water was 102°F and smelled of
sulphur. ld.
Aside from the depth of the well, there were other issues. As the well was drilled deeper,
the temperature of the water increased. R. Exhibit A. Ground water with a temperature between
85°F and 212°F is classified as Low Temperature Geothennal water (LTG). I.C. §42-233. LTG
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water is restricted in its use and development. ld. It must be used for its heat value unless
exempted. ld. According to the report sent by Mr. Duspiva to the IDWR, the temperature
increased from 70°F at 320-348 feet to 77Y2°F at 3690-362 feet, to 81°F at 500 feet, and to 85°F
at 600 feet. R. Exhibit A. On or about August 8, 2007, when Mr. Duspiva had drilled to 836
feet, the well was 91 Y2°F. ld.
On August 8, 2007, Mr. Duspiva finally talked to the Fillmores about the "problems"
with the well. Tr. Vol. la, p. 27, L. 3-8. The well was obviously over the 200 foot depth
indicated in the Start Card Permit, and the water over the 85°F limitation contained in the Start
Card Permit. In fact, on August 8, 2007, the well was officially a LTG well and had been since it
was 600 feet deep. R. Exhibit A. Such a well is subject to special construction design and other
regulatory requirements, including additional financial obligations for the owner.

IDAP A

37.03.09.030. Unfortunately, since the well was designed as a domestic well, it had not been
designed or drilled in accordance with LTG well requirements. Further, since Mr. Duspiva had
not been adequately monitoring the well bottom hole temperature, he had not complied with the
Start Card Permit Condition No.8 that required him to stop drilling and contact the IDWR if the
well temperature hits 85°F. R. Vol. 1, p. 074. The well had actually hit the LTG standard of
85°F at 600 feet. R. Exhibit A. Yet, Mr. Duspiva never told the Fillmores about hitting 85°F,
about LTG wells, or their special requirements. But on August 8, 2007, he told the Fillmores
that he needed to contact IDWR because ofthe temperature situation.
During the entire time he had been drilling, Mr. Duspiva only provided limited
information to the Fillmores. TR. Vol. 1, p. 8, L. 21-22; TR. Vol. 1, p. 22, L. 13-17. He never
told them about when he encountered LTG water, nor did he tell them there was a probability he
would hit LTG conditions if he continued to drill deeper than the 200 feet as specified in the
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pennit. TR. Vol. 1, p. 7, L. 19-23; Tr. Vol. la, p. 34, L. 19-22; Tr. Vol. la, p. 57, L. 11-19.
Instead, Mr. Duspiva remained silent except for recommending drilling deeper because of "sand"
even as he was constantly encountering layers of cold water. Mr. Duspiva never mentioned to
the Fillmores anything about the industry practice for installation of screens and filter packs to
address sand or that using a screen and filter pack would allow the well to be completed at a
shallower depth. TR. Vol. 3, p. 26, L. 16-21.

It was not until August 8, 2007, that Mr. Duspiva gave Clyde Fillmore any hint of the
temperature issue. However, Mr. Duspiva told Mr. Fillmore not to worry because Mr. Duspiva
could "fix" the problem. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 10, L. 3-7. Mr. Duspiva's "fix" was to ask IDWR for a
"variance" from the regulations for construction of a LTG well. R. Exhibit A. However, Mr.
Duspiva already had another problem that he did not disclose to Clyde Fillmore. Mr. Duspiva
had been repeatedly warned by the IDWR about using a Start Card Pennit to start shallow, cold
water domestic wells, then drilling deeper until he encountered LTG conditions. Id. Throughout
his relationship with the Fillmores, Mr. Duspiva never told the Fillmores about the regulatory
and financial requirements associated with a LTG well. Tr. Vol. la, p. 55, L. 15-20.
Mr. Rob Whitney is the IDWR employee who regulates well construction in southwest
Idaho. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 122, L. 1-4. The Fillmore's Exhibit A is a detailed report by Mr. Whitney
on the drilling of the Fillmore well.

The report details Mr. Duspiva's past problems with

complying with the IDWR well drilling rules, IDWR's warnings to Mr. Duspiva, and Mr.
Duspiva's actual knowledge of the existence of LTG conditions in the area of the Fillmore well.
According to the report, Mr. Duspiva had just completed fixing another LTG well that had been
improperly drilled only a few days prior to starting the Fillmore well. Id. The improperly drilled
well had only been fixed by Mr. Duspiva after he was given a "final opportunity" by IDWR to
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comply with IDWR rules or face a fonnal enforcement action. Id. Mr. Duspiva never told Mr.
Fillmore about these problems.
When Mr. Duspiva finally contacted the IDWR about the Fillmore well, the agency,
having repeatedly warned Mr. Duspiva about improperly drilling LTG wells, refused to grant
Mr. Duspiva a variance from the standards. R. Exhibit A, p. 2. Instead, the agency required him
to come up with a proposal to bring the Fillmore well into compliance with IDWR requirements
for construction of a LTG well.

Even though he had drilled the Fillmore well into LTG

conditions and had not constructed the well in accordance with IDWR standards, Mr. Duspiva
demanded that the Fillmores pay all the costs to bring the well into compliance including hiring
additional contractors from north Idaho and elsewhere to help Mr. Duspiva with the work. Even
though he demanded the Fillmores pay all the costs to bring the well into compliance, Mr.
Duspiva refused to tell the Fillmores the details ofthe proposed fix, who would do the work, and
what it would cost. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 91-92.
IDWR eventually required the LTG well to be closed, and the agency hired another well
driller, Down Rite Well Drilling, to do the work. Because IDWR rules impose responsibilities
on the well driller and the land owner, the Fillmores had to pay in excess of $7,000 to close the
well. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 20, L. 23. As a result ofMr. Duspiva's failure to stop drilling and contact the
IDWR when the well reached 85°F, as required by the pennit, IDWR issued a Notice of
Violation to Mr. Duspiva. Tr. Vol. 1, P. 91, L. 16-20; Tr. Vol. 2, p. 190, L. 9-21. To resolve the
Notice of Violation, Mr. Duspiva agreed to a suspension of his Start Card Pennit privileges. Tr.
Vol. 1, p. 93, L. 15-20.
At trial, Mr. Duspiva admitted that the well had not been drilled in compliance with
IDWR rules, that the drilling pennit had not been complied with, and the well did not meet
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rDWR requirements. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 94, L. 6-9. Idaho Code §42-238 requires all wells to be
constructed to IDWR standards. IDWR well drilling rules likewise require a driller to complete
a well in compliance with IDWR standards.

IDAPA 37.03.060.0I(b).

Mr. Duspiva also

admitted he had never told the Fillmores about all the responsibilities and costs associated with a
LTG well.

In fact, it was only at a meeting with IDWR on October 23, 2007, long after

completion of the well, that the Fillmores learned of the ramifications of LTG wells. R. Exhibit
A; Tr. Vol. la, p. 55, L. 2-5. Unfortunately, they learned them from IDWR, not Mr. Duspiva.
Id. Until the October 23, 2007, meeting with IDWR, Mr. Duspiva had led the Fillmores to

believe there was no problem with the well. Tr. Vol. la, p. 55, L. 15-20.
Mr. Duspiva also never told the Fillmores about his immediate past problems with IDWR
or the likelihood that the well would encounter LTG water if it was drilled deeper than the 200
feet. Instead, Mr. Duspiva just kept recommending that the well be deeper. After all, he was
charging $32.50 a foot. Despite the fact the well had been drilled in violation of the permit and
was not constructed in accordance with IDWR rules, Mr. Duspiva sued the Fillmores for the cost
of drilling the illegal well. 3
In sum, Mr. Duspiva's had drilled an 1130 foot deep, improperly designed and
constructed LTG well producing 102°F water and smelling of sulphur. He had done so after
repeatedly encountering available cold water multiple times at shallower depths. The well was
not what the Fillmores had sought or what the parties had agreed upon. 4 After the Fillmores
were forced to pay IDWR to close the LTG well, that did not end the saga because John Fillmore
still needed a domestic well for his house. The Fillmores subsequently hired Down Rite Drilling
3

The Fillmores had already paid Mr. Duspiva $20,000, however Mr. Duspiva sued for another $30,665.

4 Although Mr. Duspiva refused to disclose the actual cost to bring the well into compliance, the cost would have
been well over $100,000.00.
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to construct a domestic well like they had requested from Mr. Duspiva. Down Rite was the same
driller who had closed the illegal well. Down Rite moved over 40 feet from the illegal well,
drilled to only 320 feet, installed a screen and filter pack and produced 40 gallons per minute of
cold water at a cost of $18,000. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 22, L. 1-12.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
1.

Did the District Court Err in Finding that Mr. Duspiva Violated the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act?

2.

Did the District Court Abuse its Discretion in Allowing Edward Squires to Testify as an
Expert Witness?

3.

Did the District Court Misapply the Idaho Consumer Protection Act?

ATTORNEYS FEES ON APPEAL
The Fillmores request atto11\ey fees and costs on appeal pursuant to the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act I.C. §48-608(4), I.R.C.P. 54(d)(1)(B), I.C. §12-120(3) and I.C. §12-121.
I.

ARGUMENT

A.

Standard of Review

Review of a ruling that a party has violated the Idaho Consumer Protection Act focuses
on the factual findings by the trial court.
Findings of fact by a trial court will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52 (a). Clear error, in tum, will not be deemed to
exist if the findings are supported by substantial and competent, though
conflicting, evidence. Rasmussen v. Martin, 104 Idaho 401, 659 P.2d 155
(Ct.App. 1983) (citing JE.T. Development v. Dorsey Canst. Co., Inc., 102 Idaho
863,642 P.2d 954 (Ct.App. 1982».
Barber v. Honorof, 116 Idaho 767,780 P.2d 89 (1989).

Where there is conflicting evidence, it is the trial court that has the opportunity to judge the
credibility of the witnesses. Id.
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B.

The District Court's Findings are Supported by the Record

The district court found that Duspiva's actions violated sub-sections 16, 17, and 18 of the
Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICPA"). The general thrust of the court's findings relate to
Mr. Duspiva's failure to inform the Fillmores about the industry standard for use of screens and
filters and needlessly drilling a deep LTG well when available cold water had been found at
shallower depths.

The ICPA specifies certain unfair methods and practices.

I.C. §42-603.

Section 16 of the ICP A prohibits representing that services are needed if they are not needed. Id.
Section 17 makes unlawful false and deceptive practices. Id.

Section 18 includes instances

where the violator knowingly or with reason to know induces a consumer to enter into one-sided
transactions favoring the violator. Id.
The court made numerous findings related to the violations of the ICP A. First, because
Mr. Duspiva encountered cold water at multiple depths short of the 1130 foot LTG well, there
was no need to drill deeper and into LTG conditions. Mr. Duspiva knew there was a high
likelihood of encountering LTG conditions if he drilled deeper because he had already done that
in three other wells in the immediate vicinity of the Fillmore well. Yet, he never told the
Fillmores about the LTG situation or even gave them the opportunity to install a screen and filter
pack to address sand. Mr. Duspiva never told the Fillmores it was a well established standard
industry practice to install screens and filter packs to address sand. Importantly, Mr. Duspiva
never told the Fillmores about the costs and liabilities of a LTG well. Mr. Duspiva drilled the
LTG well, then presented it to the Fillmores in lieu of a 200 foot, cold water domestic well. In
short, Mr. Duspiva hid critical information from the Fillmores because it was in Mr. Duspiva's
pecuniary interest to drill deeper.
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C.

Mr. Duspiva Failed to Disclose Industry Standards for Using Screens
to Address Sand and to Give the Fillmores the Opportunity to
Consider Use of a Screen.

The district court made a specific finding that Mr. Duspiva violated the Idaho Consumer
Protection Act when he failed to disclose the standard industry practice of using screens, thereby
depriving the Fillmores of the opportunity to have a cold water domestic well at a reasonable
depth. The record reflects that Mr. Duspiva's sole statement to the Fillmores was that he didn't
use screens. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 38, L. 20-22. Clyde Fillmore testified that when Mr. Duspiva said
this, Clyde did not even know what a screen was. Tr. Vol. 1, p. 26, L. 1-8. Mr. Duspiva never
explained what a screen was, its purpose, or why he did not use them.
Duspiva argues on appeal that there is no evidence that he misled the Fillmores or
withheld any information. Duspiva Br. at 16. This assertion flies in the face of the court's
findings as to Mr. Duspiva's failure to inform the Fillmores about the industry standard, and Mr.
Duspiva's recommendations to keep drilling deeper, even though he had encountered cold water
at several levels far short of the 1130 feet the well was eventually drilled. The argument also
ignores the critically important IDWR report (R. Exhibit A) that documented that: (1) Mr.
Duspiva knew of LTG conditions in the area, (2) he knew about the likelihood LTG conditions
would be encountered at depths, and (3) Mr. Duspiva should have told the Fillmores of this
situation. s Instead, Mr. Duspiva remained silent and kept recommending to drill deeper, even
though the Fillmores had wanted only a cold water domestic well. The presence of cold water at
shallower depths was based on Mr. Duspiva's own testimony. Mr. Duspiva likewise failed to tell
the Fillmores about the ramifications associated with a LTG well. There is no logical reason
why Mr. Duspiva, who holds himself out as a "Master Groundwater Contractor", would not tell a
5 In fact, Mr. Duspiva's brief never mentions the IDWR report or that Mr. Duspiva received a Notice of Violation
for violating the Start Card Permit that limited the well to 200 feet and temperatures less than 85°F.
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customer about these facts. The only logical conclusion is that Mr. Duspiva did not disclose
them because they interfered with his pecuniary interest associated with his by-the-foot billing.
Mr. Duspiva admits, and the Fillmores agree, that the agreement Mr. Duspiva had with
the Fillmores was for a cold water domestic well. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 6, L. 9-11. Mr. Duspiva
admitted the Fillmores did not authorize him to drill illegally, yet he sued to collect for his illegal
drilling. Mr. Duspiva admitted he did not comply with the permit, and that the well did not
comply with IDWR standards. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 10. L. 12-15. Mr. Duspiva admitted that when the
well hit 85°F at 600 feet, he was not even monitoring the temperature as required by IDWR
rules. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 17, L. 13-14. He admitted he did not tell the Fillmores when the well hit
85°F. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 19, L. 5-7. He admitted he did not stop drilling and contact IDWR as
required by condition 8 of the Start Card Permit. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 21, L. 16-20. At trial, Mr.
Duspiva admitted he did not tell the Fillmores about the ramifications and liabilities of a LTG
well. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 27, L. 1-4. He admitted the well was not constructed consistent with IDWR
requirements. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 29, L. 1-4.

He admitted IDWR issued a Notice of Violation for

violating condition 8 of the Start Card Permit. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 55, L. 17-20. Mr. Duspiva admitted
the Fillmores never authorized him to do illegal drilling, never authorized him to drill without
complying with IDWR rules, and never agreed to pay for Mr. Duspiva to hire other contractors
to try to bring the well into compliance. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 83. He admitted he did not tell the
Fillmores about the option to use a screen and filter pack. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 85-86. He admitted he
could not bring himself to even tell the Fillmores about the option to install a filter pack and
screen so they would have the opportunity for a cold water well. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 86, L. 16-25. He
did not tell the Fillmores about the risks of hitting LTG conditions. R. Exhibit A. When he
proposed to bring in contractors from north Idaho to try to bring the well into compliance, he
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refused to tell the Fillmores any of the details such as who the contractors were or what it would
cost to fix the well, even though the Fillmores asked for the information. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 91, L. 315. Throughout the well drilling process, Mr. Duspiva's only recommendation to the Fillmores
was to keep drilling deeper. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 24, L. 12-13. The Fillmores acknowledged at trial
they did not tell Mr. Duspiva to stop drilling based on the recommendations of Mr. Duspiva. Tr.
Vol. 3, p. 24, L. 5-6. The Fillmores knew little about well drilling, nothing about LTG wells, and
Mr. Duspiva never told them. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 23, L. 1-13; Tr. Vol. la, p. 58, L. 20-25. Mr.
Duspiva never described what a screen was, how it worked, or why he did not use a screen even
though they are the well established industry standard. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 26, L. 16-21. Further, Mr.
Duspiva knew about the LTG situation in the area, the ramifications of the costs and obligations
of a LTG well, and that screens and filters are an industry standard. The record is replete with
evidence to support the district court's findings about Mr. Duspiva's actions. Mr. Duspiva
advances on appeal the very same arguments that he did at trial. One big difference between the
trial and this appellate proceeding is that the district court had a first hand opportunity to
consider the credibility ofMr. Duspiva as a witness.

D.

Mr. Ed Squire's Testimony was Consistent with the District Court's
Pre-Trial Ruling, and his Testimony was Helpful to the Court's
Understanding of Issues Related to Well Drilling.

Admission or exclusion of evidence, including expert witness testimony, is reviewed for
abuse of discretion.

White v. Mock, 140 Idaho 882, 104 P.3d 356 (2004).

The test for

determining whether the district court abused its discretion is: (1) whether the court correctly
perceived that the issue was one of discretion; (2) whether the court acted within the outer
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bounds of its discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices
available to it; and (3) whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
Mr. Duspiva argues on appeal that Mr. Ed Squires' testimony should have been excluded.
However, Mr. Duspiva fails to explain the complete background behind Mr. Squires' testimony.
Mr. Squires was not a paid expert retained by the Fillmores. Mr. Squires appeared as a witness
to explain in general about well drilling and hydrogeology. Mr. Duspiva objected to Mr. Squires
offering any opinion as to Mr. Duspiva's drilling or Mr. Duspiva's negligence. At a motion in
limine hearing prior to trial, the court indicated it would not allow Mr. Squires to testify about
Mr. Duspiva or offer any opinions as to Mr. Duspiva's negligence. Tr. vol. 3, p. 60, L. 23-25.
However, the court indicated Mr. Squires would be helpful to the court in understanding well
drilling testimony and information. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 6, L. 5-9. The court indicated that it was likely
Mr. Squires could offer information helpful to both Mr. Duspiva and the Fillmores. Tr. Vol. 3, p.
29, L. 15-17. Counsel for Mr. Duspiva was told to make " ... specific objections in trial if you
believe there is some opinion testimony coming in that relates to issues that were not disclosed to
you." Tr. Vol. 3, p. 37, L. 22-25, p. 38, L. 1. Counsel for Mr. Duspiva acknowledged his
agreement with this process:

" .. .1'11 make my objection and you'll rule, and then the case will move on."
Tr. Vol. 3, p. 60, L. 18-21.
The court ended the motion in limine hearing with specific direction to both parties that the court
would not allow testimony as to Mr. Duspiva' s negligence, but that Mr. Squires could describe
the well drilling process and educate the court on the technicalities of well drilling. Tr. Vol. 3, p.
61, L. 5-9.
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In Mr. Duspiva's brief, he points to not a single statement by Mr. Squires at trial that was

contrary to the court's direction. As Mr. Squires started to testify, counsel for the Fillmores
reminded him that he could not testify as to Mr. Duspiva's negligence. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 57, L. 8-11.
Mr. Squires verbally acknowledged that he would not do so. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 57, L. 16. Mr.
Squires testified as to well drilling in general and his own experiences in drilling and
hydrogeology. He explained that LTG water is not desirable for a domestic well. Tr. Vol. 3, p.
95, L. 11-16. He explained the use of screens and filter packs and explained that they are not
difficult to install. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 88, L. 17-19. Mr. Squires was never asked any questions nor
offered any testimony about Mr. Duspiva. Mr. Squires never uttered Mr. Duspiva's name. In
fact, the only time Mr. Duspiva's name even came up in Mr. Squires' testimony was when Mr.
Duspiva's counsel asked about Mr. Duspiva. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 98, L. 19-22.
Most telling about the appropriateness of Mr. Squires' testimony is that Mr. Duspiva's
counsel only objected one time during Mr. Squires' testimony. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 97, L. 10. That
objection was directed to a question about a well drilled by another driller. Id.

When Mr.

Duspiva's counsel objected, the court reminded Mr. Squires about avoiding any opinion
testimony about Mr. Duspiva, and Mr. Squires followed that direction. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 97, L. 1418. Mr. Squires' testimony was absolutely consistent with the court's ruling, and Mr. Duspiva
acknowledged this by not raising a single objection at trial except for the one objection regarding
another well that Mr. Duspiva did not drill. The court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law related to Mr. Squires' testimony do not even mention Mr. Duspiva. R. Vol. 2, p. 295-297.
Mr. Squires' testimony related solely to his experience and expertise with well drilling, the use
of screens and filter packs, and hydrogeology.
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Nor was Mr. Squire's testimony the only evidence at trial about these subjects. Mr.
Squires' testimony was consistent with much of Mr. Whitney's testimony and his report, as well
as the testimony of Tom Neace, another IDWR employee. Mr. Whitney and Mr. Neace are both
employees of the IDWR who were involved in the issues surrounding the Fillmore well. R.
Exhibit A. Mr. Whitney is a senior water resource agent whose duties include regulation of well
construction. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 122, L. 1-4. Mr. Neace is the manager of the IDWR Ground Water
Protection Program and supervises well drilling, geothermal resources, and well driller licensing.
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 186, L. 17-21. Mr. Neace testified that it was standard industry practice to install
filter packs and screens to address sand. Tr. Vol. Vol. 2, p. 192, L. 8-18. Mr. Squires confirmed
it was not difficult to install screens, and that he almost always did so. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 88, L. 1729. Interestingly, not only did Mr. Duspiva not object to the testimony of Mr. Squires, Mr.
Whitney, or Mr. Neace, Mr. Duspiva, who testified that he was a "Master Groundwater
Contractor" with extensive experience, did not contradict or offer any rebuttal to the testimony of
Mr. Squires, Mr. Whitney or Mr. Neace as to drilling techniques, hydrogeology, or industry
standards related to the use of screens and filter packs to address sand.

In fact, it was Mr.

Duspiva's own testimony that established the fact that there was an abundance of cold water at
much less depth than the 1130 feet Mr. Duspiva drilled to and hit 102°F water.
The record is clear that the district court gave careful attention to the issue of Mr.
Squire's testimony before trial. The court limited Mr. Squires' testimony by precluding any
testimony about Mr. Duspiva. The court made every effort to ensure the court understood the
technical issues surrounding well drilling. The court instructed Mr. Duspiva' s counsel to object
if any testimony was an opinion that had not been disclosed, and Mr. Duspiva's counsel agreed.
Mr. Duspiva's counsel raised only a single objection at trial. Further, Mr. Duspiva offered no
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rebuttal testimony to Mr. Squires' testimony.

Mr. Squires' testimony was consistent with

testimony by rDWR witnesses Rob Whitney and Tom Neace as to well drilling information
including the industry standard for screens and filters. His testimony aobut the presence of LTG
conditions was consistent with Mr. Duspiva's own testimony that he encountered an abundance
of cold water at depths much less than the 1130 feet Mr. Duspiva drilled. The district court
noted the benefit of Mr. Squires' testimony to both parties and the court. There was simply no
error in admitting the limited testimony of Mr. Squires.

Raising the issue of Mr. Squires'

testimony on appeal is frivolous, unreasonable, and lacks any foundation.
Further, except for the noted one objection to a matter that did not relate to the Duspiva
drilled well, Mr. Duspiva did not object to any of Mr. Squires' testimony at trial. Mr. Duspiva
has waived any objection on appeal. It is long settled law that a party cannot remain silent at
trial and later raise objections for the first time on appeal. Notwithstanding that the district court
did not abuse its discretion, Mr. Duspiva cannot challenge Mr. Squires' testimony at this point.
Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 59, 244 P.3d 197,203 (2010).

E.

The Fillmores Did Not "Ratify" the Terms of An Agreement to Drill a
LTG Well.

Mr. Duspiva asserts that the Fillmores somehow ratified an agreement to drill an LTG
well because they never told Mr. Duspiva to stop drilling. The assertion strains credulity and is
inconsistent with testimony at trial. Mr. Duspiva's argument seems to be that his agreement with
the Fillmores was nothing more than for him "to drill". According to his theory, he drilled, so he
should be paid whether it was reasonable or not. The fact the well was a LTG well that did not
meet IDWR well drilling standards is irrelevant to Mr. Duspiva, as is the fact the Fillmores never
once indicated they sought an LTG well.
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The record is clear that Mr. Duspiva and the Fillmores agreed Mr. Duspiva was retained
to drill a domestic well. It was to be 200 feet maximum depth according to the permit Mr.
Duspiva obtained and used to drill the well. There was never any agreement to drill a LTG well.
In fact, the Fillmores did not even know what the term meant until after the well was drilled as a
LTG well. Tr. Vol 3, p. 23, L. 1-6. They only learned about LTG and LTG wells because
IDWR told them in October, 2007. R. Exhibit A. Mr. Duspiva hid the details until after he had
drilled the illegal LTG well. The fact is that Mr. Duspiva's problem with having drilled into
LTG conditions really became problematic when IDWR refused to grant him a variance from
complying with IDWR rules and standards.

The IDWR had had enough of Mr. Duspiva's

violations of the rules. The agency ultimately issued a Notice of Violation. Yet Mr. Duspiva
persists in arguing that regardless of the fact there was an agreement to drill a domestic well,
regardless that the permit for the well was for 200 feet maximum depth, regardless of the fact
that he did not bother to inform the Fillmores or IDWR until after the well was drilled into LTG
conditions, and regardless of the fact that it was Mr. Duspiva, not the Fillmores, who drilled the
illegal LTG well, the Fillmores somehow "ratified" an agreement to drill the LTG well simply
because they did not tell him to stop.
The Fillmores explained that they did not tell him to stop because Mr. Duspiva kept
recommending to drill deeper, and they had no reason not to accept his recommendations.
However, the Fillmores testified that had Mr. Duspiva been truthful about the LTG situation,
they would have instructed him to stop. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 25, L. 14-17. The fact is that there was
never any agreement to drill a LTG well, and Mr. Duspiva's assertion there was an "agreement"
to do so based on the fact the Fillmores did not tell him to stop drilling - based on Mr. Duspiva's
recommendation - is frivolous.
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Even if there had been such an agreement, it would be void and unenforceable. 6 Idaho
scrupulously follows the rule that contracts for acts forbidden by law are void and unenforceable.

Kunz v. Lobo Lodge, Inc., 133 Idaho 608, 990 P.2d 1219 (Ct.App. 1999), (citing Tiffany v.
Boatman's Savings Inst., 85 U.S. (19 Wall) 375, 384, 21 L.Ed. 868, 869 (1973); Harris v.
Runnels, 53 U.S. (12 Howard) 79, 83, 13 L.Ed. 901, 903 (1851)). Idaho law follows the trend
that any contract made for the purpose of furthering any matter or thing prohibited by statute is
void. Porter v. Canyon County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 45 Idaho 522, 525, 263 P. 632, 633 (1928).
Moreover, Idaho case law does not allow courts to consider between whether an act was mala in

se or mala in prohibita when confronted with an act that violates Idaho statute. In Kunz, the
court noted that:
... so far as contracts in violation of statute are concerned, there is
no distinction between acts mala in se and acts mala in prohibita
.... [W]here a statute intends to prohibit an act, it must be held that
its violation is illegal, without regard for the reason of the
inhibition ... or to the ignorance of the parties as to the prohibiting
statute. (Emphasis added).

Kunz at p. 611; citing, 17 Am. Jur. 2D Contracts §251 (1991). The Kunz court left no doubt
regarding the application ofthis rule by holding that:
No principal of law is better settled than that a party to an illegal
contract cannot come into a court of law and ask to have his illegal
objects carried out; ... the law in short will not aid either party to
an illegal contract; it leaves the parties where it finds them. The
general rule is the same at law and in equity and whether the
contract is executory or executed.

Kunz at p. 611; citing, Hancock v. Elkington, 67 Idaho 542, 548, 186 P.2d 494, (1947).

6 Mr. Duspiva's breach of contract assertions are based on his illegal drilling activities. It is also well settled law
that consideration given in violation of the law or public policy is not valid consideration. State v. Clark, 102 Idaho
693,638 P.2d 890 (1981).
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According to Rob Whitney's report, testimony by Mr. Whitney, by Tom Neace, and
based on Mr. Duspiva's own submittals and testimony, the well was not constructed to IDWR
LTG well construction standards.

Even Mr. Duspiva admitted he drilled the well in

contradiction of Condition 8 of the Start Card Permit and IDWR well drilling rules. Even if Mr.
Duspiva thinks there was a contract allowing him to recover for these illegal actions, such a
contract would not be enforceable.
F. The Court Did Not Misapply the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.
Mr. Duspiva argues the court misapplied the Idaho Consumer Protection Act ("ICP A")
by: (1) not determining that there was an agreement between the Fillmores and Mr. Duspiva,
and (2) treating remedies under I.C. §48-608(1) as "cumulative". Neither argument reflects the
court's findings or ruling.
Contrary to Mr. Duspiva's argument, the court did find an agreement between the
Fillmores and Mr. Duspiva. It was an agreement to drill a cold water, domestic well of 200 feet
at $32.50 per foot. The court likewise made findings that there were three specific facts dealing
with LTG issues and one related to screen and filters, that Mr. Duspiva knew about at the time of
the agreement to drill the domestic well that the Fillmores did not know about. Fact one was that
there was a likelihood of reaching LTG conditions. R. Exhibit A, R. Vol. 1, p. 291; Tr. Vol. 2, p.
155, L. 18-21. Fact two was that a LTG well is inferior to a cold water domestic well for
domestic purposes. Tr. Vol. 3, p. 95, L. 11-12. Fact three is that a LTG well requires increased
costs and obligations. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 130, L. 1-4. Fact four is that the common industry practice
is to use screens and filter packs to address sand in a well. Tr. Vol. 2, p. 192, L. 8-18; Tr. Vol. 3,
p. 12, L. 8-14. This further confirms that there was no "agreement" for a LTG well because, by
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definition, if the Fillmores did not know about these facts, they could not have agreed to them.
This clearly rebuts any assertion there was an agreement to drill a LTG well.
Mr. Duspiva's second argument is that the court treated ICPA remedies as cumulative.
This is incorrect. The court's ruling simply acknowledges that the Fillmores would be entitled
under the statute to treat any agreement with Mr. Duspiva as void. The court's ruling also
acknowledged that the Fillmores were entitled to sue for actual damages, which they did. The
court awarded the Fillmores their actual damages. There was nothing cumulative about the
court's application of the ICPA. Mr. Duspiva's argument leads to the illogical result that a party
could violate the ICPA by deception and dishonest practices such as Mr. Duspiva's, but keep any
ill-gotten gains resulting from the deception. The option of voiding a contract that violates the
ICP A would typically apply where a deceived party has not yet been damaged, but would be if
the contract were allowed to stand or alternatively, where a party sought specific performance of
a contract that violated the ICP A. Here, the Fillmores incurred $27,500 in actual damages, and
the court correctly applied the remedial provisions of the ICP A by awarding the Fillmores their
actual damages.

G.

The Court Should Award the Fillmores their Attorney Fees and Costs
on Appeal.

In his appeal, Mr. Duspiva has advanced nothing more than the same arguments he did
below. He simply asks this court to second-guess the district court as to factual matters. Mr.
Duspiva points to not a single finding of fact by the district court that is clearly erroneous and is
not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Moreover, Mr. Duspiva's assertion that
the district court failed to apply a deception standard derived from the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) flies in the face of the factual findings made by the court. The assertion of a
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FTC deception standard is also raised for the first time on appeal. This court does not consider
substantive matters raised for the first time on appeal. Michalk v. Michalk, 148 Idaho 224, 220
P.3d 580 (2009).
Mr. Duspiva argues on appeal that Mr. Squires should not have been allowed to testify at
all. The district court limited Mr. Squires' testimony and precluded any testimony about Mr.
Duspiva. Except for one time, Mr. Duspiva's counsel never objected to Mr. Squires' testimony
at trial. The issue of whether Mr. Squires should have been allowed to testify at all is being
raised for the first time on appeal. The assertion also contradicts the very procedure agreed to by
Mr. Duspiva's counsel in the district court proceedings.
All ofthese point to the fact that there is no basis for this appeal. In addition to awarding
fees and costs on appeal under the applicable statutes, the Fillmores should be awarded their fees
and costs because this appeal has no valid foundation and is unreasonable.
II.

CONCLUSION

The record below supports the district court's finding that Mr. Duspiva violated the
ICP A. This court should affirm the district court and award the Fillmores attorney fees and costs
on appeal.

').rV

Dated this ____ day of March, 2012.
MOORE SMITH BUXTON & TURCKE, CHTD.

Attorney for the Defendants/Respondents
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